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Plaintiff and Appellant, 
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INC. , ESTATE OF THOMAS TONY 
CASTAGNO, ALBERT J. and BERNICE B. 
CASTAGNO, MYRON T. CASTAGNO, EUGENE: 
CASTAGNO, individually, and EUGENE 
CASTAGNO as Administrator of the 
Estate of THOMAS TONY CASTAGNO, 
RICHARD CASTAGNO, JOHN DOES and 
JANE DOES, One through Six, as 
Heirs of THOMAS TONY CASTAGNO, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 17241 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS MEADOW SPRINGS RANCH 
CORPORATION, INC., AND ALL CASTAGNOS EXCEPT 
ALBERT J. and BERNICE B. CASTAGNO 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MELVIN CHURCH, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
MEADOW SPRINGS RANCH CORPORATION, 
INC., ESTATE OF THOMAS TONY 
CASTAGNO, ALBERT J. and BERNICE B. 
CASTAGNO, MYRON T. CASTAGNO, 
EUGENE CASTAGNO, individually, and 
EUGENE CASTAGNO as Administrator 
of the Estate of THOMAS TONY 
CASTAGNO, RICHARD CASTAGNO, JOHN 
DOES and JANE DOES, One through 
Six, as Heirs of THOMAS TONY 
CASTAGNO, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 17241 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant filed a complaint seeking, in his first cause 
of action, to quiet title to an approved application to 
appropriate water and for damages against respondent Meadow 
Springs Ranch, Inc., for allegedly preventing appellant from 
perfecting his claim to the appropriation. 
In a second cause of action, appellant sought damages 
from respondents Albert J. Castagno and Bernice B. Castagno 
for alleged breach of an oral agreement to assist in perfecting 
appellant's claim to the subject appropriation and for alleged 
breach of an oral agreement to sell a 3/5 interest in said 
appropriation to appellant. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After a trial before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
on April 1 and 2, 1980, the Court rendered judgment in favor 
of all respondents as to both causes of action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek an affirmance of the judgments entered 
in their favor by the District Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's first cause of action sought to quiet title 
in his favor to a 3/5 interest in an approved application to 
appropriate water, No. 32822, on record with the State Engineer 
of the State of Utah. (Ex. P-1) 
The application was originally filed by Bernard Castagno 
on March 13, 1961, for 5 second-feet of water to be used for 
irrigation, stock-watering and domestic purposes. The applica-
tion was later approved and, by virtue of Change Application 
No. A-3927 (Ex. D-14), was deemed a supplemental appropriation 
in addition to 5 second-feet approved under Application No. 
30900 (Ex. P-4) • Both appropriations were to be diverted 
from the same wells and applied on a 460 acre parcel of land 
owned by Bernard Castagno and his wife Gertrude Mae Castagna. 
After Bernard Castagno's death, Gertrude Castagno 
conveyed the real property, as to which application No. 32822 
was appurtenant, to Gledhill, Inc., by a Warranty Deed dated 
March 16, 1971, and duly recorded thereafter. (Ex. P-10). 
The deed included a conveyance of all water rights appurtenant 
to the land. 
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Gledhill reconveyed the property to Terracor by a 
Warranty Deed recorded on March 23, 1971. (Ex. P-8). That 
deed also transferred all water rights used in connection with 
the property. 
Thereafter, pursuant to an exchange agreement (Ex. P-7) 
Terracor conveyed the subject property to Thomas Tony Castagno by 
a Warranty Deed dated and recorded on March 23, 1971. (Ex. 
P-6) . That deed also conveyed all appurtenant water rights. 
After the death of Thomas Tony Castagno the subject 
property was distributed to his children under a Decree of 
Distribution of the Third Judicial District Court of Tooele 
County, dated November 27, 1972. (Ex. P-11). 
The children of Thomas Tony Castagno later formed a 
family corporation, Meadow Springs Ranch Corporation, Inc., and 
conveyed the subject property to the corporation by Warranty 
Deed dated July 7, 1973, which included a transfer of all water 
rights appurtenant thereto. 
Prior to conveying the land to Meadow Springs Ranch, 
the Castagno children mortgaged the property to the Federal 
Land Bank of Berkeley, including therein the water rights 
appurtenant to the property under the subject applications. 
The Bank notified the State Engineer of its claim and the same 
was acknowledged by a letter from the State Engineer dated 
June 5, 1973. (See Ex. P-1) 
The evidence at trial indicated that two wells were 
drilled and the water appropriated under applications 32822 
and 30500 was beneficially used on the Meadow Springs Ranch 
-3-
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.... 
In support of that contention, appellant cites the case 
of McGarry v. Thompson, 114 Utah 442, 201 P.2d 288 (1948), 
correctly noting that the mere filing of an application does not 
vest a person with the right to use water unless it is approved 
by the State Engineer or district court on an appeal. Appellant's 
analysis, however, ceases at that point and ignores the remainder 
of the opinion in McGarry, supra, which is critical to and 
dispositive of the instant appeal in favor of respondents. 
In the first instance, Section 73-3-18, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953), provides specifically for the transfer or assignment of 
water rights claimed under an unapproved application to appro-
priate water so long as the conveyance thereof is in writing and 
acknowledged in the manner provided for acknowledging conveyances 
of real property. 
That statutory provision was obviously designed to 
provide for the orderly transfer of water rights where, as in 
in the initial conveyance by Gertrude Castagno, the water rights 
under an application have not yet matured into a vested right 
by way of issuance of a certificate of appropriation. 
The Utah Supreme Court in McGarry, supra, concluded that 
the statute intended there to be no distinction as to the 
transferability of an approved or unapproved water right, 
stating: 
This provision expressly 
authorizes the transfer or 
assignment of rights claimed 
under an application for the 
appropriation of water, prior 
to the issuance of a certifi-
cate of appropriation. It 
-6-
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makes no distinction between 
an approved application and 
one which has not yet been 
approved. For us to read 
into that statute such a 
distinction would be to place 
a meaning in the statute which 
there is no evidence that the 
legislature intended. 
201 P.2d at 291 
The final, and most critical, proposition set forth in 
the McGarry case deals with the question of priority of water 
rights. Under Section 73-3-18, and its predecessor statute 
considered in McGarry, the priority of a water right, once approved, 
is determined as of the date the application is filed, not the 
date a certificate of appropriation is issued. The Utah Supreme 
Court stated: 
No vested right to the use 
of water is acquired by the mere 
filing of an application to 
appropriate water. And no 
such right can be acquired as a 
result of such filing unless such 
application be approved either by 
the State Engineer, or by the 
court on an appeal therefrom. 
But the filing of such an applica-
tion is the initiating step in 
acquiring such a right without 
which no such right can be 
acquired and the priority of 
any water right later acquired 
through such initiating step is 
determined from the date of 
filing the application a~d ~ot 
from the date of appropriation. 
This is a valuable inchoate 
right which may mature into a 
vested right to the use of 
water. . .. In the face of 
this express statute and in the 
absence of any constitutional 
prohibition, we conclude ~hat 
an application to appropriate 
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unappropriated waters is 
assignable even though it 
has not been approved by the 
State Engineer. 201 P.2d at 
292. 
In applying the rationale of the McGarry case to the 
present appeal, it is apparent that Gertrude Castagna conveyed 
away all of her water rights under application No. 32822, 
whether approved or unapproved at the time of the original 
transfer being immaterial, and the ultimate right which resided 
in the Castagna heirs and Meadow Springs Ranch Corporation was 
an appropriated water right with priority as of the original 
filing date of application No. 32822 in March of 1961. 
The facts are undisputed that the water in question 
was appurtenant to the land originally owned by Bernard and 
Gertrude Castagna. The application No. 32822 made reference 
to the land, the points of diversion were on the land and the 
water was intended to be and, in fact, beneficially applied 
for irrigation purposes on the land. 
An unbroken chain of authority, as well as Section 73-3-
11, Utah Code Annotated (1953) , firmly establishes the proposi-
tion that a conveyance of real property includes water appur-
tenant to that property unless the granter "expressly" reserves 
the right to the use of the water. As stated in the case of 
Cortella v. Salt Lake City, 93 Utah 236, 72 P.2d 630 (1937), 
"(t) his has been the statutory rule at least as far back as 
1888." 72 P.3d at 635. 
... 
That rule derives from the definition of a water right 
as an incorporeal hereditament and thus real property. Cartel~ 
-8-
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v. Salt Lake City, supra; In re Bear River Drainage Area, 2 Utah 
2d 208, 271 P.2d 846 (1954). 
The only way in which Gertrude Castagno could have 
preserved an interest in the water appropriated under application 
No. 32822 would be by virtue of an express reservation in the 
Warranty Deed conveying the subject property. The case law has 
stringently applied and strictly construed the requirement 
that the reservation be "express" Stephens v. Burton, 546 
P.2d 240 (1976); concurring opinion of Justice Hall in Roberts 
v. Roberts, 584 P.2d 378 (1978). 
Not only did Gertrude Castagno, and all subsequent 
transferors, not expressly reserve a right but rather, she 
expressly conveyed in plain language all water and water rights 
appurtenant to or used in connection with the land in question. 
Appellant further seeks to support his claim to a 3/5 
interest in application No. 32822 by urging a restrictive inter-
pretation of Section 73-3-18, Utah Code Annotated (1953), so 
as to require that the only valid method of transferring the 
rights under application No. 32822 is by way of an assignment 
which, if duly acknowledged and filed with the State Engineer, 
gives the assignee a priority over an unrecorded assignment. 
Appellant's position ignores the clear import of the 
McGarry opinion which construed that statutory provision so as 
to promote the free transferability of unapproved rights which 
may later mature into vested water rights. The section was not 
intended to otherwise limit the transfer of water rights by 
deed or other conveyance. 
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Even assuming for the sake of an argument that the 
original conveyance by Gertrude Castagno of her water rights 
was ineffective to pass title to the approved application, 
appellant must still fail in his attempt to assert a valid 3/5 
interest by assignment. Under the McGarry rationale, the 
assignee must be a bona fide purchaser for value without 
notice of any previous assignment. In the first instance, 
neither the assignment from Gertrude to Albert Castagno was 
for value nor the subsequent assignment to appellant, inasmuch 
as he had already contracted to sell the land and provide the 
water described therein to Albert and Bernice Castagno. The 
assignments were purportedly intended only to complete delivery 
of the promised one second-foot of water. 
As to the remaining requirement, appellant obviously 
had notice of the previous transfer of water rights under 
application No. 32822. All of the pertinent conveyances were 
recorded with the Tooele County Recorder, imparting construc-
tive notice of the water transfers. Further, appellant had 
actual notice by virtue of his researching file 32822 at the 
State Engineer's Office which contained several references to 
the chain of title leading to Meadow Springs Ranch. 
In the language of Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135 at 
141, cited in McGarry, supra, 201 P.2d at 293: 
'Whatever is notice enough 
to excite attention and put the 
party on his guard and call for 
inquiry is notice of everything 
to which such inquiry might have 
led. When a person has sufficient 
information to lead him to a fact, 
he shall be deemed conversant of it.' 
-10-
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In this case, appellant had ample notice so as to put 
him on quard and to require him to ascertain the true title 
to the water in dispute. 
Appellant's position is simply logically absurd. To 
find that the original conveyance was void and that Gertrude 
Castagno retained an interest for many years to application No. 
32822, despite the fact that the application was perfected and 
the water beneficially applied by subsequent transferees, amounts 
to a torturing of the facts. 
The truth is that Gertrude Castagno conveyed all of her 
rights under No. 32822 with no express reservation thereof and 
the Castagno heirs and Meadow Springs Ranch received clear title 
thereto. The purported assignment of a 3/5 interest to appellant 
was merely a sham transaction. 
The findings and judgment quieting title in favor of 
Meadow Springs Ranch are amply supported by the evidence and 
should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT ON 
APPELLANT'S SECOND CAUSE OF 
ACTION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 
The trial court ruled that all issues arising from the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract executed between appellant and 
Albert and Bernice Castagno were decided in Castagno v. Church, 
552 P.2d 1282 (1976) and the same were res judicata as to the 
instant case. 
The court further found that the separate oral agree-
ment between appellant and Albert and Bernice Castagno conferred 
-11-
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upon appellant only a contingency interest in the 3/5 portion 
of application No. 32822 in issue herein and that appellant's 
3/5 interest was conditioned upon his successfully acquiring 
title to the full five second-feet appropriated under No. 32822. 
The only consideration for the 3/5 interest was to be 
the efforts of appellant in seeking to acquire title to the water 
and was not related to any claimed abatement of the purchase 
price under the land sale contract. 
Appellant's claim for damages for the alleged failure 
of Albert and Bernice Castagno to provide him with three second-
feet of water is without merit. The quieting of title in favor 
of Meadow Springs Ranch automatically voided any claim to the 
subject water for impossibility inasmuch as there was no water 
to be assigned to the Castagnos or appellant. 
In addition, the entire scheme to assign the rights 
to application No. 32822 was concocted and promoted by appellant 
and, as the trial court correctly concluded, failed only due to 
appellant's inability to perfect his claimed assignment of the 
application. 
Appellant is not entitled to damages as against Albert 
and Bernice Castagno in view of his failure to perfect title nor 
against Meadow Springs Ranch Corporation for successfully 
asserting its title to the subject appropriation. 
The trial court's judgment on appellant's second cause 
of action should be affirmed as to all respondents. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, respondents request the Court 
to affirm the judgment of the trial court in its entirety. 
DATED this '/:ti. day of May, 19Bl. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PAUL N. COTRO-MANES 
Attorney for Meadow Springs Ranch 
JOHN A. ROKICH 
Attorney for all Defendants except 
Meadow Springs & Albert J. and 
Bernice B. Castagno 
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